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World War I and Its Effects on
British Financial Institutions
GREAT BRITAIN'S effort in World War I was on an incomparably
greater scale than that of the United States or Canada, and was sizable
even on present day standards. Total government expenditures in the
war years amounted to £9.5 billion, which, judging from national
income estimates for 1913 and 1924, was possibly one-third of total
national income for the period. Total government expenditures at their
peak in the fiscal year 1918 exceeded the entire national income of 1913.
Considerably less use was made of taxation than in World War II,
and the proportion of total outlays covered by taxes was smaller in
Great Britain than in the United States or Canada. In the five fiscal
years from April 1, 1914 through March 31, 1919, 25 percent of the
government's financial resources was derived from taxes. Monetary
expansion and borrowing from the public were the chief forms of war
finance,and Lombard Street was heavily involved in both.
EMERGENCY MEASURES
Three factors influenced the Treasury's policy at the beginning of
the war. First was the lack of any real precedent for its task. Second
was the general belief that the war would be short, which seemed to
justify short-run policies such as meeting war costs by credit creation.
Third, when war broke out the City was on the verge of financial panic,
and the Treasury felt obliged to create money market conditions that
would prevent a crisis.
To this end, the government undertook a series of emergency meas-
ures. The Bank rate was raised from 3 percent on July 29, 1914 to 10
percent on August 1. On July 30 the government closed the stock
exchange. On August 2 it declared a moratorium on bills of exchange,
which was subsequently extended. On August 6 it passed the Currency
and Bank Notes Act, which gave the Bank permission to extend its
fiduciary issue without additional gold reserves. In addition, the Act
authorized the Treasury to issue £1 and lOs. notes as legal tender,
made postal orders legal tender until the Treasury notes could be
printed and circulated, and permitted the Scotch and Irish banks to
10meet their obligations with their own notes. The Treasury currency,
an innovation in British finance, was issued through the Bank of
England to the banks, and by December 31, 1918 had reached a circu-
lation of £323 million.' The government underwrote shipping insur-
ance up to 80 percent, and the Treasury agreed to guarantee the Bank
of England against loss on bills discounted for banks and brokers.
WARTIME BORROWING
These emergency measures forestalled panic, but they simultaneously
set the stage for credit inflation, and they became the basis for heavy
reliance on credit-supported short- and intermediate-term loans for
financing the war. The whole structure of debt was sustained by
increased credit from the commercial banks, based in turn upon the
Treasury's issues of currency notes. In view of the Bank of England's
readiness to discount bills, it is not surprising that the Treasury found
a ready market for its own bills; the banks could buy them and still
provide the discount market with ample funds. Influenced by the
success of its first big issue of bills, the Treasury subsequently made
liberal use of short-term finance, in the form of Treasury bills and
ways-and-means advances. Although Treasury bills were held mainly
by the discount market, on day-to-day money from the commercial
banks, the banks themselves held substantial quantities. Before the war,
ways-and-means advances consisted of advances by the Bank of England
to the Treasury on those rare occasions when the government found it
difficult to renew its bills. During the war, however, this form of borrow-
ing assumed a much more extensive role, and included borrowing
"through" the Bank as well as "from" the Bank; that is, the Treasury
borrowed spare balances of the commercial banks and of foreign
depositors, in addition to borrowing directly from the Bank.2
The Treasury also borrowed the spare balances of Public Depart-
ments. In England, certain departments of the government with their
own sources of funds and some degree of autonomy in their administra-
tion, such as the Post Office Savings Bank, the Trustee Savings Banks, the
Post Office Fund, the National Health Insurance Fund, the Unemploy-
ment Insurance Fund, the Treasury Pensions Fund, etc., and (later) the
1TheTreasury received a deposit credit with the Bank of England for the amount
of currency deposited with it, and the Bank distributed the currency to the com-
mercial banks, more or less in response to the banks' need for currency, up to a
limit of 20 percent of each bank's liabilities on deposit accounts (savings or time
deposits) plus current accounts. At the beginning of the scheme, the banks were
charged interest on the currency distributed to them. Cf. Henry F. Grady, British
War Finance, 1914-1919 (New York, 1927) pp. 13-17.
2Cf.Ti. K. Hicks, The Finance of British Government, 1920-1926 (London,
1938) pp. 320-21. See also A. W. Kirkaldy, British Finance During and After the
War, 1914-21 (London, 1921) p. 47.
11Exchange Equalization Fund, are important subscribers to government
securities.3 These departments play a particularly useful role in smooth-
ing the market for new issues, by disposing of Treasury bills, building
up their balances with the Bank, buying enough of the new loan to
guarantee its success, and then gradually disposing of their holdings
of the longer-term issues to the general public, through the government
broker, in order to replete their portfolio of Treasury bills.
The floating debt was reduced during the war period by three issues
of long-term bonds.4 The first of these, in November 1914, consisted of
3V2 percent, fourteen-year war stock, issued at 95 to yield 3.97
percent. The bonds could be paid for in instalments. The public response
was disappointing, and the banks were called upon to take nearly a
third of the total cash subscriptions, which amounted to more than
£330 million. The Second War Loan of June 1915 was hardly more
successful. While the proceeds were larger, reaching about £600
million, there were only 597,000 subscribers and the banks again took
about a third of the cash subscriptions.
A more intensive effort was made to sell the Third War Loan of
January 1917 to the public. The issue was offered in two forms, both
highly attractive. One was a 5 percent bond sold at 95, maturing in
1929-47, and so yielding 5.58 to 5.34 percent, depending on the year
of retirement. The other was a tax-free 4 percent bond maturing in
1929-42 and issued at par. The Treasury embarked upon a widespread
propaganda campaign, and even threatened compulsory purchases of
Treasury securitiesifvoluntary purchases proved inadequate.In
addition, it encouraged the banks to grant liberal advances to potential
subscribers. The loan yielded approximately £1 billion, with bank
advances being kept down to one-fifth of cash subscriptions. The num-
ber of subscribers amounted to over two million.
Three- and five-year Exchequer Bonds bearing interest of 3 to 6
percent were used to reduce the volume of floating debt between major
loan drives, and a few war savings certificates and war expenditure
certificates were issued.Startingin October 1917, however, the
Treasury abandoned tender issues for the duration, and tap issues5 of
3Accordingto U. K. Hicks (op. cit., pp. 165-70), the Unemployment Insurance
Fund in 1936 held 36.2 percent of the outstanding 1 percent Treasury bonds.
A fourth was issued in June 1919.
5"Tapissues" consisted of obligations sold by the Treasury at any time, as
distinct from "tender issues," which consisted of obligations sold only on stipulated
dates. There were four types of tap issues: 5 percent 5-year bonds redeemable at
102; 5 percent 7-year bonds redeemable at 103; 5 percent 10-year bonds redeemable
at 105; and a tax-free 4 percent of 10-year maturity redeemable at par. For a
summary table of British borrowing in World War I, see The Economist, October
4, 1919, p. 531.
12"National War Bonds" became the chief form of government borrow-
ing. Nevertheless, over the whole war period, Treasury bills accounted
for 17.2 percent and ways-and-means advances for 8.3 percent of the
total increase in internal debt. Altogether, about 25 percent of the debt
contracted was short-term. The structure of debt was radically altered
(Table 2); the funded debt (obligations with no specified maturity
date, but subject to recall) shrank from 90 percent to about 5 percent of
the total; the floating debt (less than one year's maturity) rose from
2to 23 percent; and the unfunded debt (mostly1to 10 years'
maturity) from 8 to 72 percent. Interest rates in this period rose sharply.
Table 2—BRITISH DEBT STRUCTURE, END OF FISCAL YEARSa


















Floating debtb £13 2 £1,412 23 £1,264 19 £704 11
Unfunded debtc 50 8 4,41372 4,97476 4,728 72
Intermediate-term 50 8 2,26837 2,089 32 1,59324
Long-term 2,14535 2,88544 3,13548
Funded debtd 58790 318 5 315 5 1,074 17
TOTAL 650100 6,143100 6,553100 6,505100
External debt 0— 1,292— 1,279— 1,111—
a Basedon data in Appendices to the Report of the Committee on National Debt
and Taxation (1927) pp. 14-17.
bObligationsof less than one year's maturity.
CObligationsof specified maturity over one year
d Obligations with no specified maturity.
FOREIGN BORROWING AND DISINVESTMENT
Before the United States entered the war, British domestic policy was
somewhat hampered by a belief that the sterling must be sup-
ported on the foreign exchange market. The desire to attract United
States funds for this purpose was no doubt one reason for keeping up
interest rates.
At the outbreak of war, there was a scramble for sterling which drove
the pound to a temporary premium; but by the middle of February
1915 heavy British buying in the United States had forced it back to
$4.79, which was the lowest figure on record since the 1870's. Despite
13substantial transfers of gold and a $500 million loan in New York, the
pound had sagged to $4.50 by September 1915. In December of that
year the Treasury announced its "dollar security" plan, under which it
borrowed or bought British-held American and other securities selling
on the New York exchange, and either sold them in New York or used
them as collateral for dollar loans.0
The original plan was on a purely voluntary basis. The first element
of compulsion was introduced in May 1916 in the form of a penal
additional income tax of 2 shillings on the pound on securities listed
by the Treasury as eligible under the plan. Of the billionof
American securities held in the country, $2 billion had been deposited
by January 1917 when deposit of a selected list of eligible securities was
made compulsory. The exchange yielded by the plan, together with
proceeds from the sale of $250 million of Exchequer Bonds, $300 of
3- to 5-year bonds, and $250 million of 1- to 2-year bonds, was sufficient
to maintain the pound at $4.75-$4.77, although the list of eligible
securities bad to be extended untilitfinally included 900 items.
Altogether, some £900 million of foreign investments were liquidated,
mostly American railway securities. After the United States entered
the war, direct loans to the British government made it possible to
withdraw certain securities from the list.
BANK OF ENGLAND
The Bank of England's first wartime task was to help the Treasury
stave off panic in the London money market. During the summer and
autumn of 1914, the Bank announced that it would make loans to the
acceptance houses, backed by a Treasury guarantee, discount bills
without recourse to the holder, and make advances to lenders to the
amount of 60 percent of the value of securities held by the lenders
against any loan outstanding on July 29. The discount rate was lowered
from 10 to 5 percent, and kept between 5 and 6 percent for the dura-
tion of the war.
As the government's banker, the Bank assisted in the flotation of
Under the original plan, the Treasury paid '/2 of 1 percent of the face value of
securities borrowed, as well as dividends accruing while the stocks were in Treasury
hands. If the Treasury found it necessary to sell borrowed securities, it paid the
lender the New York price plus 2'/2percent.In August 1916 the plan was elabo-
rated considerably. Under this broader plan securities were deposited with the
Treasury for a period to expire by the end of March 1922, subject to the right of
the Treasury to reLurn them to the lender at any time on or after March 31, 1919.
The lender received'/2of1percent as before; but if the stocks were sold, the
lender received all payments he would have obtained from them in the five-year
period, and at the end of that time the Treasury replaced them with similar
securities or repaid the deposit value plus 5 percent.
14war loans, serving as an agent for their sale. It also provided the joint
stock banks with funds to meet temporary drains resulting from the
marketing of these loans. For example, in the First War Loan, the
Bank offered to make loans to the joint stock banks against war loan
stock at the attractive rate of 1 percent below the Bank rate. Since
the banks took nearly a third of this loan directly, and probably
acquired more of it in the open market, this offer afforded a cheap
and convenient means for the banks to borrow from the Bank of
England. In early 1916, the Bank inaugurated the practice of borrow-
ing the spare cash of commercial banks and holding it in the form
of deposits withdrawable at three days' notice and bearing 3 to 5 per-
cent interest; against this cash the Bank made advances to the Treasury.
Indeed, the most striking wartime change in the Bank's weekly return
was the rise in the banking department's portfolio of government
securities, from £11.0 million on July 29, 1914 to £62.6 million on
November 27, 1918, or from 13 percent of total assets to 33 percent.
The Bank's note circulation increased in the same period from £55.1
million to £93.7 million.7
Superficially,littleof the close relationship of the Bank to the
Treasury and to the joint stock banks survived the reconstruction
period. Such wartime innovations as direct lending to banks, borrowing
from the banks and making ways-and-means advances "through" the
banks, paying interest on deposits, and the special interest rate on
foreign deposits, were scrapped within a year of the cessation of
hostilities. The Treasury notes, another war phenomenon, were taken
over by the Bank as part of its fiduciary issue, and its monopoly of
the note issue was thus restored. However, despite the Treasury's heroic
and partially successful efforts to consolidate its debt (see Table 2),
government securities remained a much larger share of the assets of
the Banking Department than they were before the war. Between
June 30, 1919, when they reached their peak, and March 31, 1920,
ways-and-means advances from the Bank of England and Public
Departments were cut from £774 million to £205 million, and were
further reduced to £139 million by March 31, 1926; but the Bank's
holdings of government securities dropped only from an average of
£58 million in April 1920 to an average of £41 million in April
7Inview of the expansion of bank deposits and the availability of Treasury cur-
rency, the growth of Bank of England note circulation requires explanation. The
suspension of the gold requirement for Bank of England notes seems to have been
used for only two days after passage of the Currency and Bank Notes Act, to fill the
need until the new Treasury currency could be printed. It seems likely that the
increased stamp duty led to increased use of cash in general, and that the £1
and lOs. Treasury notes became inconveniently small as prices rose.
151926. Assistance with government finance in general continued to be
an important aspect of the Bank's operations. Such being the case, it
seems likely that the Bank's actual relationship with the Treasury was
much closer in the decade following the war than in the decade
before it.
The war reduced the power of the Bank in a number of subtle but
significant ways. First, the relative displacement of sterling trade bills
by Treasury billsin the portfolios of banks and discount houses
diminished the effectiveness of the Bank's discount policy in controlling
domestic credit. The supply of Treasury bills was dictated by consider-
ations of public finance rather than by conditions of the money market;
and, unlike the supply of commercial bills,it was not affected by
changes in the Bank rate. On the other hand, the discount rates on
commercial bills were inevitably influenced by rates on Treasury bills.
While the Treasury no doubt consulted the Bank concerning its bill
policy, the demands of war finance inevitably, shifted some measure of
monetary control from the Bank to the Treasury.8
In addition, the substitution of Treasury bills for commercial bills
reduced the effectiveness of foreign exchange control through changes
in Bank rate. Whereas a change in the rediscount rate could influence
the flow of foreign funds into and out of London through borrowing
and repayment under sterling acceptances, it did not influence the flow
of Treasury bills. This development was only partially offset by the
growth between 1920 and 1931 of deposits by foreigners, which were
relatively responsive to changes in Bank rates.
This weakening of the Bank's control of international capital move-
nients had four aspects, according to W. A. Brown: the Treasury bill
did not broaden the market for sterling exchange in the same degree as
the sterling acceptance did; it did not draw deposits to London; it did
not multiply the effectiveness of changes in the Bank rate on the
exchange market; and the decline in the volume of bankers' accept-
ances, together with an expansion of the volume of Treasury bills
B According to Lord Bradbury, the postwar situation was such "as to render the
task of the Bank of England in controlling the supply (as distinct from the price)
of the basis of credit extremely difficult. The main cause of this has been the
enormous amount of Treasury bills. This has resulted not only in increasing the
dimensions of the bill market (and so making larger scale operations necessary to
produce a given effect) but also in altering its character. When the holdings of the
market were mainly commercial bills drawn on London on foreign account, a rise
bank rate diminished the supply of these bills. Now that the market holdings are
largely Treasury bills.. arestriction in the volume of bankers' cash, followed by
a reduction of their market money, merely ...drivesthe 'market' 'into the Bank,'
i.e., forces the Bank of England to recreate the credit it has previously withdrawn
•.." Reportof the Commzttee on Finance and Industry (the Macmillan Report)
Cmd. 3897 (London, 1931), Memorandum of Dissent by Lord Bradbury, p. 274.
16outstanding, transferred some of the initiative in the control of sterling
exchange from the grantors of sterling acceptance credit to foreign
investors in British Treasury bills.9
There were other difficulties. The war led to such widely varying
degrees of inflation in different countries that stabilization of foreign
exchange rates through gold flows, price changes, and money market
adjustments alone was impossible. Stabilization was eventually accom-
plished on the basis of various domestic policies, arrived at inde-
pendently. The distribution of the world's monetary gold stocks was
inconveniently uneven.10 Mainly because of political insecurity, inter-
national capital movements did not proceed in an orderly manner
through the London banking system, but were large and erratic. Sterling
was not unchallenged as an international currency.'1
Moreover, industrialization of other countries was stimulated, while
Britain's peacetime industries lost ground. Britain's merchant marine
dwindled 10 percent between 1910 and 1920, while the United States'
merchant fleet expanded 50 percent and that of Japan more than
doubled. New York established itself as a strong competitor in the
international money market. During the war the sterling bill lost its
unique position as the most acceptable means of payment for American
imports, and dollar bills of exchange grew in volume and importance.
The telegraphic transfer tended to reduce the volume of sterling
acceptances. Embarrassing balances of Dominions and neutrals accumu-
latedin London. Wartime controls over the London and other
European stock markets made New York the chief trading center for
securities. New York supplanted London as the world's main source
of credit.
In the entire period between World War I and World War II, the
chief problem of Central Bank policy was the British balance of pay-
ments and the pound-dollar relationship. After World War I, opinion in
both the United States and Britain turned against the wartime system of
pegging the pound by American loans. Early return to the gold standard
was considered desirable, and the general opinion was that return to
the old rate of £1 = $4.87 was a matter of honor and essential to the
WilliamAdams Brown, Jr., The International Gold Reinterpreted,
1914-1934(NationalBureau of Economic Research, 1940) Vol.I, pp. 643-54.
See also A. T. K. Grant, A Study of the Capital Market in Postwar Britain
(London, 1937) pp. 90-98, and N. F. Hall, The Exchange Equalization Account
(London, 1935) pp. 85 if.
10 Even when an international gold exchange standard was eventually restored
in 1928, it no longer had a single center but a "nucleus" of several leading money
markets.
11 The development of the "sterling bloc" in the early thirties clearly demon-
strated that the sterling exchange standard was no longer an international gold
standard.
17recovery of prestige by the City.'2 Consequently, from 1919 to 1925
financial policy was dominated by efforts to bring the pound close
enough to $4.87 to warrant return to gold at that rate. The instrument
chosen was the classical one of endeavoring to affect price levels and
capital movements by alterations of the Central Bank discount rate.
British policy had perforce to be deflationary relative to the American.
It was wishfully thought that American prices would rise so that relative
deflation would require no reduction of British prices, but this hope
was frustrated by the collapse of American prices in 1920-21. At last,
in response to a number of factors,'3 the pound reached $4.84, the
gold export point, toward the end of April 1925, and a month later
the Gold Standard Act was passed, re4uiring the Bank to sell gold
for 77s. 10I/2d. per ounce.14
JOINT STOCK BANKS
In World War I the joint stock banks had the dual role of providing
the Treasury with funds and financing wartime industry and trade.
Deposits doubled, investments grew from 13 percent of total assets in
1913 to 20 percent in 1918, while discounts and advances fell in the
same .period from 56 percent to 48 percent, and acceptances shrank
from 6 percent to 3 percent. Moreover, the ratio of bills discounted to
advances rose from around 20 percent to more than 60 percent, mainly
because of the acquisition of a large volume of Treasury bills.
Over the war period as a whole, the banks took only some 5-10
percent of the increase in long-term government debt. Loans to cus-
tomers under the "borrow-to-buy" policy introduced in the Third War
Loan of January 1917 contributed more than direct purchases by banks
to the success of long-term issues. The banks advertised their willingness
to lend against War Loan stock at 1 percent below the Bank rate to all
purchasers of the Loan; and, as noted above, about one-fifth of total
cash subscriptions to the Loan were financed in this manner.
Investments as a percentage of assets reached their peak in 1915.
In the late years of the war, purchases of Treasury bills and indirect
loans through Bank of England ways-and-means advances were a more
12 According to W. A. Brown (op. cit., Vol. I, p. 221), Britain's decision to return
to gold at the old parity was made on the very day that she departed from the
gold standard in 1914.
13 For a full discussion of these factors, see W. A. Brown, op. cit., Vol. II.
14 The extent to which "overvaluation" of the pound was responsible for the lack
of prosperity in Britain between 1925 and 1929 is not easily determined, but it
clearly was a contributing factor. In sharp contrast to the prewar period, when the
average annual rate for the pound tended to run above par, the pound was below
par in every year between 1925 and 1931. There was a persistent tendency for gold
to flow Out, and British interest rates were kept relatively high throughout the
entire period.
18important form of financial assistance than purchases of long-term
bonds. Altogether, the banks probably took 20 percent to 25 percent of
the increase in debt directly, and perhaps financed as much again
indirectly. By the close of 1918 investments of the banks were three
times their 1913 figure; and the proportion of bills discounted that
consisted of Treasury bills was much higher than before the war.
The prewar trend toward amalgamation, which had lowered the total
number of British banks from 155 in 1895 to 77 in1914, was
accelerated during the war period. The most spectacular amalgamations
occurred among the London joint stock banks; the 12 largest of these
amalgamated into 5. In the same period the total number of London
clearing banks was reduced from 17 to 11.15 As for the private banks,
only six survived the war. The concentration of banking power arising
from amalgamation fostered a fear of monopoly in the financial field,
and led to the introduction of the Joint Stock Banks (Amalgamations
Control) Bill of April 1919. This Bill would have made consolidation
subject to approval of the Treasury and the Board of Trade. The Bill
was never passed, but the mere discussion of it was enough to check
the movement toward concentration of banking.
In the early postwar years, interest rates on government securities
were lower than rates on commercial loans, and the wartime growth
of government obligations in bank portfolios brought a lower average
return on bank assets. Such a development is not inconsistent with a
rising rate of return on bank capital, when, as in this case, assets are
rising relative to capital. The spread between rates on government
securities and those on commercial lo4ns may explain the increased
competition for commercial paper after the war, both among the
joint stock banks themselves and between those banks and other finan-
cial institutions. The competition among the banks took the form of
an increase in the number of branch offices and bidding for deposits
through the interest allowance.
Prior to the war the banks had acted merely as agents in the market-
ing of new issues, but after the war they acted increasingly as principals.
They also invaded the acceptance market, arguing that with the growth
of corporate organization in trade the personal contacts of the merchant
bankers were less essential to the business of accepting bills. During the
twenties, advances generally formed a somewhat higher proportion of
15 Bank amalgamations, which usually resulted in the writing down of capital,
tue a partial explanation of the decline in the ratio of capital to deposits from
10 percent at the beginning of the war to 6 percent at the end, and the concomitant
rise in the ratio of deposits to total liabilities from 84 percent in 1913 to 91 percent
in 1918. However, the simple fact that deposits increased without a commensurate
increase in capitalization for banks in general is undoubtedly the major factor in
these relationships.
19deposits than before the war, probably as a result of the gradual dis-
placement of commercial paper by bank overdrafts.
In the thirties, there was a decline in bank advances relative to total
assets. This decline can be explained in part by the efforts of the accept-
ance houses to reintroduce acceptances as a credit instrument in
domestic trade, and partly by the increasing importance of self-finance
in British industry.. Postwar reconstruction in England brought greater
use of the corporate organization, and greater concentration of indus-
trial enterprises. The new giant corporations relied more and more on
self-finance, building up their liquid funds out of undistributed profits.
This tendency toward self-finance becomes more noticeable still when
the composition of the bank's advances is analyzed.16 The most striking
feature is the small percentage figures for such important industries
as textiles, "heavy" industries, leather, rubber, and chemicals, and the
decline of these figures over the period 1930-38. Most of what they lost,
however, was gained by the item "other advances," which are primarily
personal and professional loans.
In order to recover some of the lost market for advances, the banks
departed somewhat from their policy of making only short-term self-
liquidating loans of moderate size, by occasionally granting large
advances for capital expansion, in the expectation. of repayment out of
subsequent capital issues. In general, however, the banks continued to
adhere to their traditional principles.
Investments declined somewhat during the twenties, both in absolute
volume and as a share of total assets; at the same time Treasury bills
averaged higher than commercial bills, despite the reduction of the
floating debt and the consequent contraction of banks' holdings of
Treasury bills. With the onslaught of the great depression, the volume
of Treasury bills in bank portfolios rose, while commercial bills dropped
sharply and investments began to increase again.
DISCOUNT MARKET
The outbreak of war in 1914 caused a great dislocation in the London
bill market, mainly because of the importance of England's trade with
Germany, and also because of the market's complete unpreparedness
for the war. In addition to the emergency measures outlined above,
the Bank of England relieved the market of bills whose normal liquida-
tion was rendered impossible by the war.17
When the foreign bills outstanding had been liquidated, the market
16 For figures on bank advances see Appendix Table C.
17 For a brief description of the measures taken, see W. A. Brown, op.. cit.,
pp. 2 1-23.
20was left with ample resources but little normal business for their employ-
ment. Its liquid funds, however, were soon taken up by Treasury bills;
and for the duration of the war the market's main function was the finan-
cing of the floating debt. The result was a somewhat increased margin,
which varied fromto 1 percent, between the bill rate and the money
rate, and financial strengthening of the discount companies. The ebb
and flow of the market's normal activities subsided almost completely,
however; arbitrage was rendered impossible by the pegging of exchange
rates; and .there never was any need for rediscounting with the Bank
of England. The Treasury, as the market's main customer, acquired
complete control over the "open market rate," especially from 1916
onward, when it issued Treasury bills "on tap," in unlimited quantities
at fixed rates.
The replacement of commercial bills by Treasury bills hit the discount
market more directly than the joint stock banks. Not that the discount
houses and merchant banks lacked outlets for their funds; Treasury bills
served perfectly well for that purpose. But discount houses were no
better equipped for handling Treasury bills than were other financial
institutions. This fact, together with the growth of public corporations
whose relative merits could be more easily judged by non-specialists
than was the case for individual enterprises and partnerships, exposed
the discount houses to increased competition from the joint stock
banks.18
While the partial funding of the floating debt and the revival of
international trade after the war brought the discount market closer
to its normal activities, the market was less important than in prewar
years. Other financial centers, especially New York, competed with
London in international finance. The internal bill virtually disappeared
from the London market, and domestic trade was increasingly financed
by the joint stock banks, in the form of overdraft facilities or discounts.
Treasury bills became a permanent feature of the discount market; and
throughout the period between the two World Wars, Treasury bills
made up more than half the total volume of bills held by the London
market.
The discount houses were never in serious danger during the depres-
sion of the thirties. The Bank of England stood ready to discount bills
affected by the German and Austrian standstill agreements, thus remov-
18 As W. A. Brown put it, "The growth in the number of acceptances bearing
the names of the joint stock banks (as distinct from merchant banks) seemed to
the discount houses to improve the quality of bills. At the same time, however,
this change in names together with the predominant importance of the treasury bill
was gradually taking from the discount houses their genuine economic function of
making a market for, maturing, and judging bills." Op. cit.) Vol. I, p. 649.
21ing illiquidity of continental bills; and help was given to the discount
houses when gilt-edged securities depreciated in 1931-32. However,
the discount market was adversely affected by the decline in interest
rates in the thirties, especially since (judging from the accounts of the
"big three") their portfolios showed little over-all expansion. The partial
replacement of bills by short-term bonds in the discount houses' port-
folios was no doubt a response to the declining rate on the former,
and may explain the rise in net profits of the "big three" after 1933.
The depression also resulted in further contraction of international
trade, and further substitution of Treasury for commercial bills.
MERCHANT BANKS
Most seriously affected by changes in the position and operations of the
London discount market were the merchant banks. These houses, more
than other financial institutions in Lombard Street, traded upon their
personal knowledge of commercial concerns; accordingly, when the
importance of this knowledge diminished, their loss was considerable.
Similarly, the merchant banks relied heavily on the supremacy of
London in international finance, and therefore they suffered the greatest
loss from the growing competition and competence of other financial
centers and from the decline in international trade during the twenties
and thirties.
Not only did the volume of trade bills decline after World War I;
their quality deteriorated. Bills drawn by the foreign seller of goods
were increasingly replaced by bills drawn by an importer or a bank,
representing goods not yet sold. The line of demarcation between trade
bills and finance bills became less clear-cut. Moreover, the wartime
disruption of trade with the continent, and the loss of direct -contact
with continental traders, diminished the confidence of the merchant
banks in their own judgment of continental firms.
The uncertainty introduced by the war and reconstruction into the
acceptance market had two direct consequences. One was the innova-
tion of granting acceptance credits to foreign bankers, as distinct from
foreign traders. Another was the tendency for the acceptance houses
to reorganize as limited liability corporations; partnerships were becom-
ing too risky for the acceptance business. This revised form of organiza-
tion probably diminished, rather than enhanced, the reputations of the
acceptance houses.
The merchant banks suffered further blows during the depression.
From 1928 to 1933, British foreign trade was so sharply contracted
that the market for acceptance credit was cut approximately in half;
and the expansion of the discount market facilities which had taken
22place in the twenties, in response to the opportunity for profitable
investment in Treasury bills, proved to be excessive. Moreover, during
the financial crisis of 1931 acceptance credit granted to continental
bankers for short-term financing was used for long-term investment in
industry, to the misfortune of the London discount houses. Abandon-
ment of the gold standard in the same year restricted merchant-bank
operations abroad. The scale of their operations in the long-term capital
market also diminished. Their attempt to recoup losses by reviving the
domestic bill market was thwarted by slack business and by a reduction
of minimum rates for bank credit below the traditional 5 percent.
CAPITAL MARKET
During the war years, restrictions Were imposed on new issues in the
capital market. In 1915, issues were permitted only with the approval
of the Treasury; a committee was appointed "to consider and advise
upon applications received by the Treasury for approval of fresh issues
of Thecommittee, which included the Governor of the Bank
of England and a representative of the Board of Trade, was to bar all
issues on behalf of foreign borrowers, and to authorize issues on behalf
of borrowers at home and within the Empire only when they appeared
to be in the public interest. No restrictions were imposed on home
investment through private channels, except by urging the purchase of
war bonds, but the government had direct control over home invest-
ment through allocation of raw materials.
There was widespread recognition that the regular sOurces of long-
term capital for domestic purposes would be unable to meet the greatly
increased demands of the reconstruction period. A parliamentary
"Committee on Financial Facilities for Trade" was appointed in 1916
to consider this problem; and on recommendation of this committee
the British Trade Corporation was founded in an effort to introduce in
England the continental system of industrial banking. In 1917 a com-
mittee appointed by the Exchequer suggested that the joint stock banks
should depart from their traditional short-term lending policy and
assist reconstruction by lending on long term to domestic enterprises.
No departure from traditional British banking practice proved to be
necessary, however, for the problem was finally solved by adjustments
in the capital market. The political uncertainty of the twenties and
thirties, together with American competition, decreased the attractive•-
ness of foreign investment, which was also discouraged by the authori-
ties. Finding its main outlet blocked, the new issues market turned to
the domestic field for new customers. At the same time the resources
19TheEconomist, January 30, 1915, p. 185.
23market for investment opportunities when the war-loan campaigns
came to an end.
The discrepancy between the geographic distribution of the demand
for capital and of the supply of loan funds, arising out of changes in
industrial location, led naturally to increasing reliance on the stock
exchange, as distinct from personal relations, for the financing of
industry. The growth of building societies, insurance companies, and
investment trusts for the mobilization of small savings further increased
the market's resources, because the funds of these institutions were
available for investment in marketable securities. Higher death duties,
which increased the importance of having investments in liquid form,
may also have played some role in the expansion of domestic security
markets.
The London capital market ceased to be primarily an organization
for overseas lending and became the main channel for long-term invest-
ment at home. The investment houses, specializing by industries, made
closer contacts with domestic enterprises; and the industries that came
into existence in this period were usually established on a corporate
basis. Subsidiary changes in the nature of British long-term lending
during the twenties and thirties were the sharp decline of overseas
railroad financing compared with prewar years, and the growing scale
of borrowing by local public authorities and by local industrial and
financial concerns (Chart 1).
It is interesting to note that between the returnto the gold standard
and the crisis of 1929, Britain regained some of the foreign investment
market from the United States.2° British new foreign lending as a
percentage of American rose from 36 in 1925 to 52 in 1928.
SUMMARY
By 1914, Lombard Street had enjoyed half a century of stability and
prosperity, interrupted only by minor crises. By 1939, the British finan-
cial system had been shaken by 25 years of almost unceasing uncertainty
and varying degrees of depression. In view of the enormity of the prob-
lems it faced, Lombard Street showed great strength and considerable
flexibility in the interwar period; but changes came so fast that the
adjustment of the financial organization to these changes necessarily
lagged somewhat. At the beginning of World War II the British money
market was considerably less secure than it was on the eve of World
War I.
20SeeW. A. Brown, op. cit., Vol. I, p.618.
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